This is the first attempt to study leasing in the context of the international trade in cultural artifacts. This Article advances a heated debate in the field of cultural heritage law, which centers on whether cultural artifacts of ancient civilizations should belong to the modern nation states from which they are excavated or to humankind in general, by proposing an alternative analytic framework based on leasing. This framework would make it possible for objects to circulate but at the same time stay under the ownership and jurisdiction of their respective source countries.
Literary hoaxes have taken many different appearances, and their ability to continue to evade early detection by publishing houses, readers and reviewers adds to their mischievousness and the intrigue surrounding them. Typically, hoax literature provides a compelling narrative that lures readers into valuing the words being read because they are supposed to be true. Consequently, once the hoax is revealed for what it is, readers often experience strong feelings of disappointment, anger and embarrassment for having been tricked; some are even amused for having been played the fool. Countless times, the book industry has been brought under fire for not catching a hoax before a book is released for public consumption and allowed to ravage unsuspecting readers. Despite cries for reform, few changes have been made and publishing companies have increasingly been hailed into court for resolution of disputes arising from these literary capers. In fact, over the last century, hoaxes have spawned congressional hearings, lawsuits and even criminal prosecution, yet they show no sign of slowing and, if anything, have only grown more prevalent.
This article examines the tradition of the literary hoax, and then focuses on three unique examples that resulted in court intervention. Part I provides a brief history of literary hoaxes and samples the many guises they have taken over the years. Parts II, III and IV provide detailed accounts of the hoaxes perpetrated by Arthur Train, Clifford Irving and James Frey, respectively, and explore how Train got away with his mischief, Irving ended up behind bars, and Frey and his publisher became entangled in a class action lawsuit and a multimillion dollar judgment. Part V attempts to reconcile the differing outcomes for Train, Irving and Frey. As there is a dearth of case law clarifying what acts might result in civil liability, an examination of past hoaxes and their resulting litigation lends some lucidity as to what acts might result in imprisonment, monetary damages and public acquittal for one’s literary sins.
Digital media has challenged copyright law in the past decades. The ease with which digital files can be copied and disseminated has amplified copyright infringement and jeopardized the profitability of copyright-based industries around the globe.
In this article I propose a solution: to complement the copyright system with a Fair Trade Copyright system. The Fair Trade Copyright system, which would apply optimally in the realm of the music industry, would encourage users to donate to recording artists on digital platforms and distribute the donations to artists.
The implementation of my proposal will yield several improvements over the current system. First, it would enlarge the pie of revenues that flow into the music industry. Second, it would compensate recording artists, who are under-protected in the current regime, and augment their incentives to create. Third, this model would monetize illegal music consumption, and would achieve this at a relatively low cost and without harming law-enforcement efforts. Fourth, and finally, the model would potentially change the power balance within the music industry in favor of artists instead of intermediaries.
The prospect of downstream alteration raises questions about the appropriate scope of licensing terms, the objectives of copyright law and even the meaning of art. It provides an impetus to tackle these questions by concretizing what was once but a thought experiment. Part I introduces the notion of copy ownership and contrasts it with the increasingly popular method of licensing copyrighted works. Part II argues that downstream alteration of a copyrighted work through the use of software-like updates impermissibly expands authorial control. Finally, Part III briefly outlines several ways in which licensing terms that purport to allow the copyright holder to make downstream changes to a copyrighted work can be limited.
This Note argues that the circuits’ use of vague formulations in interpreting RLUIPA is overly restrictive and that an alternative multifactor approach—one that considers both the manner in which the state implements its law and the manner in which the church experiences the burden—would provide a more practical, workable paradigm for courts to employ in the future in resolving actual historic preservation and land use disputes. That is, this Note suggests that it is the circuits’ very reliance on talismanic formulations that is problematic because RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision, particularly in the land use context, does not lend itself to the kind of bright-line definitions that the circuits have developed. The solution is not to choose among the circuits’ formulations but to chart a new approach entirely. To clear some underbrush, Part I introduces the structure and text of RLUIPA and outlines the colorful legislative history of the statute. This Part sketches the roughly ten-year prelude to RLUIPA, which commenced with the Supreme Court’s landmark free exercise decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith and climaxed with a constitutional waltz between Congress and the Court. Part II provides an in-depth examination and critique of regnant approaches to interpreting RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision. It argues that the various formulations relied on by the circuits, though derived through different means, are problematic in that they do not provide a workable framework for courts to use in deciding actual disputes. Part III first proposes an alternative multifactor framework that courts can employ to resolve real RLUIPA controversies. It then illustrates the utility of this analytical approach by applying it to the case of the Third Church.